An Unusual Spill Successfully Handled
F. Colin Duerden and James J. Swiss

On March 15, 1979, the British Tanker Kurdistan, owned by the Nile Steamship Co. Ltd. of Newcastle, England, was bound from Point Tupper, NS, to Quebec City loaded with 29,662 tons of Bunker C oil. At 1420 hours, when situated 50 nautical miles northeast of Sydney, Cape Breton, the tanker, lashed by gale force wind, in ice-infested water, developed vertical gashes below the waterline in the number 3 wing tanks. These tanks, which had a total capacity of 10,000 tons, soon began to leak oil.

Stern section being manoeuvered into Port Hawkesbury, N.S.

Surveyors onboard the Coast Guard vessel Sir William Alexander, which was dispatched to assess the Kurdistan's damage, advised the tanker to slowly proceed to Sydney, the nearest port of refuge. However, a short time later the Kurdistan split in two, spilling 7000 tons of oil from the number 3 tanks into the turbulent water. Surprisingly, the two sections of the vessel remained intact, and leaked no oil. In a daring rescue, all of the 41 crew members were removed from the stern section by the Sir William Alexander.

Those agencies responsible for addressing the various aspects of the emergency were now faced with three distinct problems: the bow section afloat with 7000 tons of oil; the stern containing 16,000 tons; and the oil that had escaped during the breakup.

Within one hour of the accident, preliminary information had been reported to the Canadian Coast Guard Traffic Centre in St. John's, Newfoundland; it was then relayed through a fan-out system to other relevant organizations. The Environmental Protection Service (EPS) of Environment Canada was informed of the incident at 1440 hours on the day of the accident and immediately took steps to initiate the formation of response teams to advise the Coast Guard On-Scene Commander (OSC).

Since this incident was a marine accident involving a ship, it fell under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) who administer the Canada Shipping Act. As administrators of this Act, CCG assumed the role of OSC for the incident and became responsible for all decisions relating to the response and recovery effort. Advisory teams were developed to advise the CCG regarding various aspects of the incident.

As managers of the Regional Environmental Emergencies Team (REET), EPS was responsible for ensuring that a response organization was developed to provide assistance and environmental advice to the OSC. Since three distinct and separate problems were at hand, it was necessary to develop a response organization to deal with these problems separately.

Group 1 - bow section: The Bow Section Advisory Group was established to advise the OSC regarding the environmental implications of decisions relating to the bow section of the ship. This group consisted of representatives from various organizations in the federal government including the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR), Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), Atmospheric Environment Service (AES), and the Environmental Protection Service (EPS) of the Department of Environment. The EPS provided the chairman for the group.

Although other courses of action (e.g. salvage) were considered, CCG decided, for a variety of reasons, that sinking was the only feasible option for dealing with the bow section and the Bow Section Advisory Group was asked to recommend an appropriate disposal site.

The site selected was at position 41°55.02'N,60°58.00'W, and was based on the following criteria; (1) the site was located between two current systems (Gulf Stream and Labrador Current) and was presumed to have low current velocities; (2) water depth was at least 2,600 fathoms; (3) the site was beyond the limits of the continental slope, so that the amount of seabird activity was minimal; (4) the site was removed from the fishery resources and fishing activity of the Scotian Shelf; and, (5) it was distant from both the Nova Scotia and Sable Island shorelines reducing the likelihood of these shores being oiled if further spillage occurred. Based on these recommendations and other stipulations regarding the actual sinking procedure, the bow was towed to the recommended dump site and scuttled on April 1, 1979.

Group 2 - stern section: As for the bow group, the Stern Section Advisory Group was developed to offer advice to the OSC regarding the fate of the stern section of the ship. The organizations that participated as part of the bow group were also represented on this advisory group.

On March 18, the OSC decided, on the basis of onboard investigations by salvage experts and CCG staff, that the stern section was salvageable. The decision was made to tow this section of the vessel to a port in Nova Scotia for removal of the approximately 16,000 tons of oil still onboard.

The OSC requested the Stern Advisory Group to investigate the feasibility of four ports for possible lightering operations. These were Gabarus Bay, Port Hawkesbury, Country Harbour, and Halifax Harbour.

Each location was evaluated by the use of five criteria: environmental sensitivity, exposure to sea and weather; potential for cleanup; travel distance; and population. Based on the analysis, the group recommended Port Hawkesbury as the most acceptable location for the lightering operation and the operation was carried out successfully on March 28 - 30, 1979.

Group 3 - oil spill cleanup: The group developed to advise the OSC regarding cleanup needs and priorities consisted primarily of EPS personnel. However, many other agencies contributed professional advice to EPS, including the Atlantic Geoscience Centre (coastline assessments), Canada Centre for Remote Sensing (reconnaissance surveys), Department of Fisheries and Oceans (sensitivity maps), advice from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans personnel, Parks Canada personnel, and Nova Scotia Department of Environment.

In spite of the large amount of resources brought to bear on the cleanup effort, the oil released during the rupture of the Kurdistan still presented problems to the agencies involved. With the assumption that the oil would eventually come ashore, several topics had to be addressed, including (a) the location of the oil; (b) evaluation of threatened ecological areas and species (e.g. marshes, waterfowl, shellfish areas); (c) establishment of cleanup and communication centers; (d) cleanup methods, including specialized methodology (e.g. for marshland areas, oil in ice); (e) environmental effects; and (f) inspection tours.

Location of the oil. The inclement weather in the days after the breakup of the Kurdistan proved a problem in the effort to track the escaped oil. Continuous surveillance of the shoreline by Coast Guard helicopters revealed that there was no contamination of the ice or of the shores in the initial days. In an effort to increase surveillance capabilities, an airplane specially fitted with remote sensing devices developed through Environment Canada's Arctic Marine Oil Spill Program, was employed. This aircraft operated in cooperation with the Centre for Cold Ocean Resources Engineering at Memorial University in Newfoundland and the Canada Center for Remote Sensing. Initially, the remote sensing missions centered on establishing the location and extent of the oil. Later, the missions provided imagery for the study of the behavior of oil in ice. Although the remote sensing apparatus was measurably successful, locating the oil at sea and tracking its movements proved to be a practically insurmountable problem throughout the lengthy period of the oil cleanup.

The CCG flew several reconnaissance missions daily over the affected area, ships in the vicinity were asked to maintain a lookout for floating oil, and fisheries officers and park wardens maintained a shoreline search. However, a great deal of this effort was fruitless and oil continued to come ashore, without warning, along the length of the eastern Nova Scotia shoreline and the southern coast of Newfoundland throughout the summer of 1979.

The difficulty in locating the oil resulted directly from the fact that the oil often did not float at the surface, but remained some distance below. In the final analysis, the oil had to be dealt with on a "clean it up as it comes" basis, and when reports of oiling of various parts of the shoreline were received, cleanup crews were dispatched to address the problem.

Evaluation of threatened ecological areas and species. The possibility of inundation of the Nova Scotia shoreline by the greater part of 7,000 tons of bunker oil meant that an assessment of the ecologically sensitive areas and species of these areas had to be made to determine the potential for damage. A joint effort by Environment Canada personnel and staff of the Atlantic Geoscience Centre (AGC), Geological Survey of Canada, resulted in assessments and environmental data for the coastline of Nova Scotia from Glace Bay to Halifax.

The data from the AGC included a division of the area into zones based on geology, coastal physiography, and shoreline types. A general description was given for each zone, and details were provided on tidal range and wave exposure, shoreline characteristics (e.g. length, percent beaches, percent cliffs, number of tidal inlets), vulnerable areas (barrier beaches, lagoons, marshes), accessibility, and possible protective measures. Finally, an overall assessment of the various zones in terms of the above parameters was provided.

The assessment by the Department of Environment included navigational information (location of wharves and harbours, depth of harbours, underwater hazards, coves, breakwaters); location of biologically sensitive areas (including seabird colonies, stopover zones for migratory waterfowl, shellfish-growing areas, marine-mammal breeding areas, and areas frequented by marine mammals); commercial fisheries (including landed value); fish processing plants; and surface currents and temperature.

Establishment of cleanup and communication centers. The establishment of cleanup and communication centers depended to a large extent on the degree of oiling of different areas of the shoreline. In order to address this problem, the CCG established cleanup and communication centers at Low Point and Mulgrave, Nova Scotia. The EPS also set up field offices at these locations to coordinate the environmental aspects of the cleanup.

As the summer progressed and the oil spread southeast along the Nova Scotia coast, the focus of communication and cleanup needs also shifted; the center was then established in the capital city of Halifax, remaining there until the cleanup was terminated. The EPS representative at the Low Point and Mulgrave centers was able to channel many of his requests for environmental advice through the Halifax headquarters, which, with its more comprehensive communications network, was able to fan out to various sources to meet the requests of the onscene environmental coordinator.The centers also served as staging areas for cleanup equipment and crews, and as a base for helicopters engaged in surveillance and cleanup work.

Cleanup methods. The efforts mounted to combat the spill stretched from the cold days of winter through the hot summer into early fall. Therefore, cleanup methods had to address not only the type of shoreline and species threatened, but also the weather likely to be experienced during the particular season in which the cleanup was being conducted.

Initially, a band of ice ranging in width from several feet to several miles coated the Cape Breton shoreline, providing a mixed blessing for those involved in oil spill cleanup. On the one hand, the ice acted as a perfect natural barrier holding the oil offshore long enough to allow the problems of addressing the bow and stern to be met without having to face cleanup responsibilities immediately. It also allowed sufficient time to assemble manpower and equipment at strategic locations where it appeared probable that the oil would come ashore.

On the other hand, the oil in ice presented almost insurmountable difficulties with respect to cleanup. It was obvious that the oil was merely being held away from the coast temporarily and that with the spring melt, the oil would find its way ashore. One avenue of approach lay in cleaning up the oil from the ice before it could come ashore. To this end, CCG fitted a barge with backhoes, booms, and sorbent material. The barge was towed to areas of oil and oil in ice and attempted to scoop the oil from the water. Although partially successful, the area over which the oil had spread was too large for this effort to be effective. In the end, the oil had to be removed as it came ashore, with cleanup crews using rakes, shovels, and pitchforks. The viscosity of the oil in the cold weather was such that it could be easily removed into stout plastic bags by the use of such methods.

Cleanup crews

During the cleanup, EPS provided environmental information on beach cleanup and protection methods and set priorities as to the areas to be cleaned in order of environmental importance. Several areas such as marshland, recreational beaches, and offshore islands required specialized attention.

In areas where the fishing industry is active, the oiling of fishing gear was unavoidable. Fish nets were heavy casualties, and in order to clean them, a fish-net laundromat, initially built during the Arrow oil spill in 1970, was reconditioned and put to use. The laundromat was very successful, cleaning nearly 100 nets and cleanup equipment, such as oiled booms, as well.

In all, over 550 miles of coastline was cleaned as a result of the Kurdistan spill, yielding close to one million bags and almost 1,500 barrels of oily debris.

Environmental effects.

By far the most visible victims of the spill were the dead and dying birds, which washed ashore by the hundreds. It is impossible to arrive at an accurate figure for the number of birds killed, because up to 80 % may have died at sea and never washed ashore. However, the Canadian Wildlife Service estimated that the total number ranged from 12,000 to 25,000. Most of the inshore birds killed were gulls and ducks, especially Old Squaw, Eiders, and Scoters, while at sea Auks such as Murres and Dovekies were seriously affected. There was also some mortality among seals, but damage to shellfish areas was minimal.

The overall effect of the bunker C on the shoreline itself was relatively minor. Because of the thickness and consistency, the oil generally remained on the surface of the beaches without sinking into the sand; thus, it was easier to remove without causing undue disturbance to the shoreline. Furthermore, heavy machinery, such as bulldozers and payloaders, was not employed on the beaches, a lesson learned from the "Arrow" cleanup.

The marsh areas were particularly sensitive, not only to oiling, but to methods of oil spill cleanup. Some consideration was given to using a sod cutter to remove contaminated grass, but the method was deemed too severe, and ordinary rakes and garden hoes were employed to preserve the root system and thus ensure future growth.

Inspection tours. The shoreline was subjected to many inspection tours, generally by EPS personnel, often in conjunction with CCG, CWS, and AGC. Members of other agencies such as fisheries officers, park wardens, and Nova Scotia Department of Environment staff also provided valuable assistance. Each cleaned area was inspected to determine its suitability from an environmental viewpoint and EPS personnel advised CCG when a cleanup became environmental acceptable. Where re-oiling occurred, as it often did, the beach was reinspected after subsequent cleaning.

In this way, not only were over 500 miles of shoreline cleaned, but a rigorous environmental inspection of the cleaned area was conducted.

By mid-September, 1979, most of the cleanup of Nova Scotia beaches had been completed although spotty re-oiling still occurred from time to time. In total, over 997,000 bags and 1,500 barrels of oily debris were collected and this material required a method of disposal.

Initially, oily waste was disposed of at municipal landfill and strip mine sites throughout Cape Breton Island. As the quantities of oil and debris increased, however, these municipalities started to voice concerns and it was necessary to make new arrangements. Representatives from the Nova Scotia Department of Environment selected sites at Hadleyville, Forchu, and St. Peter's on Cape Breton Island for development as disposal sites. These sites were chosen on the basis of their accessibility, soil characteristics, ground-water levels, and proximity to cleanup locales. Once operations were complete, the sites were landscaped to the specifications of the Nova Scotia Department of Environment.

Once the cleanup operation was complete, the obvious question asked by both those involved in the response and onlookers was "Was the response to this incident a good one?" In addition, people wish to know what was learned during the response effort and how future responses may be improved by the experience gained.

A number of meetings were held among those agencies involved in the incident to conduct postmortem evaluations of the response effort. The general consensus at these meetings was that although a number of difficulties were experienced during the response effort, on the whole, the Government's reaction to to the incident was a good one for the following reasons:

1. Relatively little oil was spilled. Although the vessel was carrying approximately 30,000 tons of Bunker C, only the 7,000 tons released during the initial stages of the mishap was spilled and the remainder was either salvaged or disposed of safely at sea.
2. There was relatively little environmental damage. Apart from a large number of seabirds (12-25,000) and damage to fishing gear ($800,000), there was no apparent long-term impacts related to this incident.
3. A number of gaps were identified in the knowledge needed to deal with this type of spill under Canadian conditions. Steps have been taken to fill these gaps.
4. A number of modifications have been made to the Regional Environmental Emergencies Team response mechanism so that future incidents will be dealt with more effectively.
5. A number of new contingency plans have been developed to ensure that responsible agencies are better prepared to participate in future response efforts.

The Kurdistan was a relatively small tanker by world standards and the spill, although difficult at times, was of a size and nature that could be handled with a moderate response effort. Tankers much larger than the Kurdistan continue to ply Canadian waters and those responsible for dealing with accidents involving such ships must hope that the lessons learned from dealing with incidents such as the Kurdistan can be applied effectively to events of a greater magnitude.